| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows GDI allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Active Directory Domain Services allows an authorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Weak authentication in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Error Reporting allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Function Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Image Acquisition allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Buffer over-read in Windows CD-ROM Driver allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255.
Because the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array.
The length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact.
The fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation. |
| The STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_stm32wba.c computed the packet length of a received frame as pkt_len = rx_frame->length - IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH without first checking that the radio-reported length could hold an FCS. pkt_len is a uint8_t, so a reported length of 0 or 1 wrapped to 254 or 255. The only bound on the resulting value was __ASSERT_NO_MSG(pkt_len <= CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE), which compiles to nothing in the default production configuration (CONFIG_ASSERT=n).
The length originates in the ST link-layer receive-done metadata (p_metadata->length, stored by stm32wba_802154_receive_done()), and ultimately in the PHY header of a frame received over the air, so it is influenced by any attacker within radio range of the device. Reaching the underflow requires the vendor link layer to surface a frame shorter than the FCS with no error; the driver performed no validation of its own on that value.
When the underflow occurs, stm32wba_802154_rx_thread() calls net_pkt_write(pkt, rx_frame->psdu, pkt_len) with a length of about 254 bytes against a receive buffer that holds at most one PHY packet (IEEE802154_MAX_PHY_PACKET_SIZE, 127 bytes). This reads roughly 128 bytes past the end of the radio receive buffer and copies that adjacent memory into a network packet that is submitted to the networking stack, giving an out-of-bounds read with a potential disclosure of adjacent RAM plus needless oversized packet allocation in the RX thread.
The fix rejects a frame whose reported length is smaller than IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH before the subtraction, and replaces the compiled-out assertion with a runtime length check that drops oversized frames — matching the runtime check already present in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_nrf5.c. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft PostScript Printer Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft PostScript Printer Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows iSCSI allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in SQLite allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Buffer over-read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
