| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc
Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread
semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency
assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to
bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put
... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref
no longer points at.
Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding
vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't
race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child
runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier
CLONE_VM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/dma-buf: fix UAF with retry loop
Retry doesn't work here, since bo will be freed on error, leading to
UAF. However, now that we do the alloc & init before the attach, we can
now combine this as one unit and have the init do the alloc for us. This
should make the retry safe.
Reported by Sashiko.
v2: Fix up the error unwind (CI)
(cherry picked from commit 479669418253e0f27f8cf5db01a731352ea592e7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When
ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls
through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to
devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks
"if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;
users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via
to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences
the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: use safe list iteration in radar detect work
The call to ieee80211_dfs_cac_cancel can cause the iterated chanctx to
be freed and removed from the list. Guard against this to avoid a
slab-use-after-free error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails
If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the
interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must
not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif
being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is
already being removed, so that doesn't need changes.
This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's
enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's
not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN
The shadow MMU computes GFNs for direct shadow pages using sp->gfn plus
the SPTE index. This assumption breaks for shadow paging if the guest
page tables are modified between VM entries (similar to commit
aad885e77496, "KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even
when creating an MMIO SPTE", 2026-03-27). The flow is as follows:
- a PDE is installed for a 2MB mapping, and a page in that area is
accessed. KVM creates a kvm_mmu_page consisting of 512 4KB pages;
the kvm_mmu_page is marked by FNAME(fetch) as direct-mapped because
the guest's mapping is a huge page (and thus contiguous).
- the PDE mapping is changed from outside the guest.
- the guest accesses another page in the same 2MB area. KVM installs
a new leaf SPTE and rmap entry; the SPTE uses the "correct" GFN
(i.e. based on the new mapping, as changed in the previous step) but
that GFN is outside of the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range; therefore
the rmap entry cannot be found and removed when the kvm_mmu_page
is zapped.
- the memslot that covers the first 2MB mapping is deleted, and the
kvm_mmu_page for the now-invalid GPA is zapped. However, rmap_remove()
only looks at the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range established in step 1,
and fails to find the rmap entry that was recorded by step 3.
- any operation that causes an rmap walk for the same page accessed
by step 3 then walks a stale rmap and dereferences a freed kvm_mmu_page.
This includes dirty logging or MMU notifier invalidations (e.g., from
MADV_DONTNEED).
The underlying issue is that KVM's walking of shadow PTEs assumes that
if a SPTE is present when KVM wants to install a non-leaf SPTE, then the
existing kvm_mmu_page must be for the correct gfn. Because the only way
for the gfn to be wrong is if KVM messed up and failed to zap a SPTE...
which shouldn't happen, but *actually* only happens in response to a
guest write.
That bug dates back literally forever, as even the first version of KVM
assumes that the GFN matches and walks into the "wrong" shadow page.
However, that was only an imprecision until 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU:
Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages") came along.
Fix it by checking for a target gfn mismatch and zapping the existing
SPTE. That way the old SP and rmap entries are gone, KVM installs
the rmap in the right location, and everyone is happy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync
Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale
connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the
resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the
connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the
pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete().
Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking
a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and
dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock
are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while
hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on
hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del().
hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put
(which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under
hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way.
Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally
dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free
via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF and double free in smb2_open_file()
Zero out @err_iov and @err_buftype before retrying SMB2_open() to
prevent an UAF bug if @data != NULL, otherwise a double free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain()
In the drain loop, the local variable 'runtime' is reassigned to a
linked stream's runtime (runtime = s->runtime at line 2157). After
releasing the stream lock at line 2169, the code accesses
runtime->no_period_wakeup, runtime->rate, and runtime->buffer_size
(lines 2170-2178) — all referencing the linked stream's runtime without
any lock or refcount protecting its lifetime.
A concurrent close() on the linked stream's fd triggers
snd_pcm_release_substream() → snd_pcm_drop() → pcm_release_private()
→ snd_pcm_unlink() → snd_pcm_detach_substream() → kfree(runtime).
No synchronization prevents kfree(runtime) from completing while the
drain path dereferences the stale pointer.
Fix by caching the needed runtime fields (no_period_wakeup, rate,
buffer_size) into local variables while still holding the stream lock,
and using the cached values after the lock is released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kthread: consolidate kthread exit paths to prevent use-after-free
Guillaume reported crashes via corrupted RCU callback function pointers
during KUnit testing. The crash was traced back to the pidfs rhashtable
conversion which replaced the 24-byte rb_node with an 8-byte rhash_head
in struct pid, shrinking it from 160 to 144 bytes.
struct kthread (without CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP) is also 144 bytes. With
CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT and SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN both round up to
192 bytes and share the same slab cache. struct pid.rcu.func and
struct kthread.affinity_node both sit at offset 0x78.
When a kthread exits via make_task_dead() it bypasses kthread_exit() and
misses the affinity_node cleanup. free_kthread_struct() frees the memory
while the node is still linked into the global kthread_affinity_list. A
subsequent list_del() by another kthread writes through dangling list
pointers into the freed and reused memory, corrupting the pid's
rcu.func pointer.
Instead of patching free_kthread_struct() to handle the missed cleanup,
consolidate all kthread exit paths. Turn kthread_exit() into a macro
that calls do_exit() and add kthread_do_exit() which is called from
do_exit() for any task with PF_KTHREAD set. This guarantees that
kthread-specific cleanup always happens regardless of the exit path -
make_task_dead(), direct do_exit(), or kthread_exit().
Replace __to_kthread() with a new tsk_is_kthread() accessor in the
public header. Export do_exit() since module code using the
kthread_exit() macro now needs it directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nexthop: fix percpu use-after-free in remove_nh_grp_entry
When removing a nexthop from a group, remove_nh_grp_entry() publishes
the new group via rcu_assign_pointer() then immediately frees the
removed entry's percpu stats with free_percpu(). However, the
synchronize_net() grace period in the caller remove_nexthop_from_groups()
runs after the free. RCU readers that entered before the publish still
see the old group and can dereference the freed stats via
nh_grp_entry_stats_inc() -> get_cpu_ptr(nhge->stats), causing a
use-after-free on percpu memory.
Fix by deferring the free_percpu() until after synchronize_net() in the
caller. Removed entries are chained via nh_list onto a local deferred
free list. After the grace period completes and all RCU readers have
finished, the percpu stats are safely freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent possible UaF in addrconf_permanent_addr()
The mentioned helper try to warn the user about an exceptional
condition, but the message is delivered too late, accessing the ipv6
after its possible deletion.
Reorder the statement to avoid the possible UaF; while at it, place the
warning outside the idev->lock as it needs no protection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: clear cloned request bio pointer when last clone bio completes
Stale rq->bio values have been observed to cause double-initialization of
cloned bios in request-based device-mapper targets, leading to
use-after-free and double-free scenarios.
One such case occurs when using dm-multipath on top of a PCIe NVMe
namespace, where cloned request bios are freed during
blk_complete_request(), but rq->bio is left intact. Subsequent clone
teardown then attempts to free the same bios again via
blk_rq_unprep_clone().
The resulting double-free path looks like:
nvme_pci_complete_batch()
nvme_complete_batch()
blk_mq_end_request_batch()
blk_complete_request() // called on a DM clone request
bio_endio() // first free of all clone bios
...
rq->end_io() // end_clone_request()
dm_complete_request(tio->orig)
dm_softirq_done()
dm_done()
dm_end_request()
blk_rq_unprep_clone() // second free of clone bios
Fix this by clearing the clone request's bio pointer when the last cloned
bio completes, ensuring that later teardown paths do not attempt to free
already-released bios. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: fix use-after-free in add_adev() error path
If auxiliary_device_add() fails, add_adev() jumps to add_fail and calls
auxiliary_device_uninit(adev).
The auxiliary device has its release callback set to adev_release(),
which frees the containing struct mana_adev. Since adev is embedded in
struct mana_adev, the subsequent fall-through to init_fail and access
to adev->id may result in a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving the allocated auxiliary device id in a local
variable before calling auxiliary_device_add(), and use that saved id
in the cleanup path after auxiliary_device_uninit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sockmap: Fix use-after-free of sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready().
syzbot reported use-after-free of AF_UNIX socket's sk->sk_socket
in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0]
In unix_stream_sendmsg(), the peer socket's ->sk_data_ready() is
called after dropping its unix_state_lock().
Although the sender socket holds the peer's refcount, it does not
prevent the peer's sock_orphan(), and the peer's sk_socket might
be freed after one RCU grace period.
Let's fetch the peer's sk->sk_socket and sk->sk_socket->ops under
RCU in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880594da860 by task syz.4.1842/11013
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 11013 Comm: syz.4.1842 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x8a3/0xe80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2482
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:721 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x972/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2671 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1bd/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7facf899c819
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007facf9827028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007facf8c15fa0 RCX: 00007facf899c819
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000500 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007facf8a32c91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007facf8c16038 R14: 00007facf8c15fa0 R15: 00007ffd41b01c78
</TASK>
Allocated by task 11013:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4538 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4866 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x2b8/0x640 mm/slub.c:4885
sock_alloc_inode+0x28/0xc0 net/socket.c:316
alloc_inode+0x6a/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:347
new_inode_pseudo include/linux/fs.h:3003 [inline]
sock_alloc net/socket.c:631 [inline]
__sock_create+0x12d/0x9d0 net/socket.c:1562
sock_create net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
__sys_socketpair+0x1c4/0x560 net/socket.c:1803
__do_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1856 [inline]
__se_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1853 [inline]
__x64_sys_socketpair+0x9b/0xb0 net/socket.c:1853
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 15:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2685 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:6165 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x187/0x630 mm/slub.c:6295
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: Flush anchored URBs in usbtmc_release
When calling usbtmc_release, pending anchored URBs must be flushed or
killed to prevent use-after-free errors (e.g. in the HCD giveback
path). Call usbtmc_draw_down() to allow anchored URBs to be completed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().
Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80
Call Trace:
nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
__ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
__sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320
Allocated by task 75:
nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00
Freed by task 26:
nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the
to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size
of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk,
instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value.
This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator
initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the
write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because
KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses
that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to
userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in
response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second
fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack
variable.
The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate
task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly
freed data.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984
CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0
memcpy+0x20/0x60
complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
RIP: 0033:0x42477d
Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37
flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking
KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by
overwrite the data value with garbage.
Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to
just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to
implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure
those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses
on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand
in the emulator context, and *al
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Require sys_futex_requeue() to have identical flags
Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete
This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory. |
