| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file
The refactoring in commit a28d893eb327 ("md: port block device access to file")
accidentally causes the caller's thread keyring to be kept alive long
beyond the caller's lifetime.
As a result, "cryptsetup luksSuspend" silently fails to wipe the
LUKS volume key from memory.
In detail: "cryptsetup luksOpen" uses its supposedly ephemeral thread
keyring to pass the volume key to the kernel. dm-crypt's
crypt_set_keyring_key() copies the key material into its own
crypt_config structure and then drops its own reference to the key in
the keyring with key_put().
With this fix, restoring pre-v6.9 behavior, the copy in the thread
keyring is then promptly garbage collected, such that exactly one copy
of the volume key remains. This single copy is correctly wiped from
memory on "cryptsetup luksSuspend".
Without this fix, the thread keyring and the volume key in it remains.
This second copy is only freed on "luksClose". "luksSuspend" neither
knows about this copy nor has any way to remove it, so the key remains
recoverable from RAM after a suspend that is documented to have wiped it.
This fix should not introduce new security problems, as the code is
anyway gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The device-mapper core, not the calling
task, is the legitimate owner of this long-lived file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Validate the packet length reported by the NIC
Validate the packet length reported in the RX CQE before passing it
to skb processing. The CQE is supplied by the NIC device and should
not be blindly trusted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations
In net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table
builds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV,
LLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which
sets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern
nl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via
NL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Any local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve
the "802.15.4 MAC" family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev
that has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw
16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied
verbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply.
Recovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality
and authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates
and encrypts frames.
Impact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte
AES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has
an administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY
dump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family.
Introduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but
setting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump
entries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the
modern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged
readers by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and
NL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry "can be retrieved by unprivileged
users" annotations). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup
set_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the
IPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from
ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped
extension headers and found the real transport header.
This makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP
packets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an
8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by
sctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the
SCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves
from NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established
timeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters
incorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not
completed.
Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for
the SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without
extension headers this preserves the existing offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix more places with wrong ipv6 transport offsets
Sashiko reports for more incorrect IPv6 transport offsets.
The app code for TCP was assuming IPv4 network header
even after the ipvsh argument was provided. This can
cause problems with apps over IPv6. As for the only
official app in the kernel tree (FTP) this problem is
harmless because we use Netfilter to mangle the FTP
ports and we do not adjust the TCP seq numbers.
Also, provide correct offset of the ICMPV6 header in
ip_vs_out_icmp_v6() for correct checksum checks when
the IPv6 packet has extension headers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix handling of AIF enable without AISB
When a guest seeks to register IRQs without a summary bit specified,
ensure that the associated GAITE then stores 0 for the guest AISB
location instead of virt_to_phys(page_address(NULL)). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size
This field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific
limits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Prevent rereg_mr for non-mem regions
When a QP/CQ/SRQ is created, a two step process is used
where the buffer is allocated in userspace and explicitly
registered with the normal reg_mr mechanism prior to creating
the actual QP/CQ/SRQ object.
These special registrations are indicated via an ABI field
so the driver knows that they do not have a valid mkey and
to skip the actual CQP command submission.
Since these are real MR objects from the core's perspective,
it is possible for a user application to invoke rereg_mr on them
and cause a real CQP op to be emitted with the zero-initialized
mkey value of 0.
Fix this by preventing rereg_mr on these special regions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmxnet3: fix BUG_ON in vmxnet3_get_hdr_len() for Geneve packets
vmxnet3_get_hdr_len() assumes gdesc->rcd.v4/v6/tcp always describe the
outer header, but for a Geneve-encapsulated packet the device can set
them based on the inner header instead, signalled by the
VMXNET3_RCD_HDR_INNER_SHIFT bit in the completion descriptor. Since the
function never skips the outer encapsulation, this mismatch triggers:
- BUG_ON(hdr.ipv4->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP), because the outer
protocol is UDP (Geneve), not TCP.
- BUG_ON(hdr.eth->h_proto != ...), when the tunnel's outer and inner
IP versions differ (e.g. outer IPv6/inner IPv4 or vice versa).
Check VMXNET3_RCD_HDR_INNER_SHIFT up front and bail out, since the
function cannot locate the inner header it would need to parse. Also
convert the remaining BUG_ON()s in this function to return 0
defensively. |
| Coder from 2.26.0 before 2.34.8 contains an incorrect authorization flaw in the GET /api/v2/workspaces/{id}/acl endpoint, which checks only workspace read access and then fetches group members using an elevated system context. Authenticated users granted workspace use access can query the endpoint to harvest group members' emails, login types, status, and last-seen and creation timestamps. |
| A vulnerability was determined in datastax pulsar-jms up to 9.0.3. This issue affects the function decode of the file pulsar-jms/src/main/java/com/datastax/oss/pulsar/jms/messages/PulsarObjectMessage.java. This manipulation causes deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.35.0, ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load() includes the raw uri value in wrapped exceptions when AMQP URI parsing fails. Because the URI may contain a plaintext username and password, startup logs, application performance monitoring systems, CI logs, and copied stack traces can disclose broker credentials to users who should not have access to them. This issue is fixed in version 5.35.0. |
| FOSSBilling is an open source billing and client-management platform. From 0.1.0 until 0.8.7, the unauthenticated api/guest/system/template_exists endpoint permits path traversal because templateExists uses Path::join on the attacker-controlled file parameter without rejecting .. sequences or verifying that the resolved path remains inside the active theme directory. The trigger is an unauthenticated request to guest/system/template_exists containing traversal sequences in the file parameter. An attacker can submit traversal sequences in the file parameter and observe the returned boolean to determine whether arbitrary files or directories exist on the server. The oracle does not disclose file contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.7. |
| FOSSBilling is an open source billing and client-management platform. From 0.1.0 until 0.8.7, the unauthenticated POST /api/guest/client/create endpoint reveals whether a submitted email belongs to a registered client because guest signup returns a distinct unredacted error when the submitted email already exists. The trigger is an unauthenticated request to POST /api/guest/client/create with a target email address. An attacker can compare the guest-signup response for a target email to determine whether the email belongs to an existing FOSSBilling client. Box\Mod\Client\Api\Guest::create returns the error after Client\Service::clientAlreadyExists finds a matching record, and the API response exposes that exception message without redaction. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC active reference counts
HEVC slice parameters are shared stateless V4L2 controls, but the common
validation path does not verify the active L0/L1 reference counts before
driver-specific code consumes them.
The original report came from Cedrus, but the active count bounds are
not Cedrus-specific. Validate them in the common HEVC slice control path
so stateless HEVC drivers get the same basic guarantees as soon as the
control is queued.
Do not reject ref_idx_l0/ref_idx_l1 entries here. Existing userspace may
use out-of-range sentinel values such as 0xff for missing references, and
some hardware can use that information for concealment. Keep this common
check limited to the active reference counts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size
aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied
win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not
return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to
compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to
zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access.
Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first,
then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of
proceeding with a broken allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors
A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a
monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the
existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that
there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it
is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a
valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted
and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor
count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open
a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the
"BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is
triggered.
This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject
arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON.
[ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: reject zero bucket types in crush_decode
CRUSH bucket type 0 is reserved for devices. The mapper relies on
that invariant and uses type 0 to identify leaf devices.
If crush_decode() accepts a bucket with type 0, a malformed CRUSH map
can make the mapper treat a negative bucket ID as a device and pass it
to is_out(), which then indexes the OSD weight array with a negative
value.
Reject zero bucket types while decoding the CRUSH map so the invalid
state never reaches the mapper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path
In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates
a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While
rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes
to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted
reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in
__rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because
rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() ->
__rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From
__rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which
leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore,
the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request()
and the assertion triggers.
This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the
rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map
update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the
message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was
zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for
this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED
The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an
in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A
non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a
challenge ACK.
RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in
SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact
in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.
Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC
sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns
challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets
can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own
out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response. |
