| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access
sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates
dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() /
sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These
take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command
register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not
allowed from atomic context.
Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced
in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and
netdev_rx_mode_work"). The async callback is invoked from process
context, so the mutex and sleeping completion poll can remain.
Observed with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK,
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES and CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 217, name: ip
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
Call trace:
__might_resched+0x144/0x248
__might_sleep+0x48/0x7c
__mutex_lock+0x74/0x850
mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
sparx5_mact_learn+0x78/0x100
sparx5_mc_sync+0x40/0x54
__hw_addr_sync_dev+0xc4/0x170
sparx5_set_rx_mode+0x4c/0x58
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x64/0xa4
__dev_open+0x1ec/0x26c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops
htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.
Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.
The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classification.
htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT,
whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL
handler in htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so
drop the ifdef around it. This matches hfsc_enqueue(), which has always
handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built
without actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32,
CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR.
- Create an HTB qdisc on a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class
1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting
1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1.
- Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed kernel the classify loop
spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics.
- Reachable from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure
__ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() removes matching maple tree ranges in
batches, but first stores each range into a temporary xarray so that the
pages can be unpinned after dropping the maple tree lock.
That temporary xarray is filled under the maple tree lock with
xa_store(..., GFP_ATOMIC). If the store fails before mas_erase(), the
current range is left in the tree and the helper returns false. The
outer ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() loop then immediately retries the same
range. While the atomic allocation keeps failing, the teardown path has
no forward progress.
The issue can be reproduced with radix_tree_node failslab injection after
a SHMEM_ZC buffer has already been registered:
# Kernel config:
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_UBLK=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
# CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION=y
# CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS=y
# CONFIG_FAILSLAB=y
echo 10 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
mkdir -p /tmp/htlb
mount -t hugetlbfs none /tmp/htlb
fallocate -l 4M /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf
dev_id=$(kublk add -t null --shmem_zc \
--htlb /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf |
awk -F '[ :]' '/dev id/ {print $3}')
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/slab/radix_tree_node/failslab
echo Y > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/cache-filter
echo Y > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/ignore-gfp-wait
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/interval
echo -1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/times
echo 100 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/probability
kublk del -n "$dev_id"
On the unfixed kernel the delete command was still running after 3
seconds. Disabling failslab made it return. The fault-injection stack
showed:
should_failslab
kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof
__xas_nomem
__xa_store
xa_store
__ublk_shmem_remove_ranges
ublk_cdev_rel
ublk_ctrl_del_dev
Remove the allocation from the teardown loop. Keep the existing batch
limit, but collect {base_pfn, nr_pages} pairs in a fixed-size stack array.
Once a matching range is found, the range is erased from the maple tree
before dropping the lock, so each successful scan makes progress without
depending on any GFP_ATOMIC allocation.
With the same failslab settings, the fixed kernel completed
"kublk del -n $dev_id" successfully in about 45 ms. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: fsl_audmix: rework runtime PM handling in probe
After pm_runtime_enable() the AUDMIX block is powered off and stays
suspended until the first runtime resume. Register writes issued between
probe() and the first resume (e.g. from DAPM or ALSA control paths)
target unpowered hardware and cause a system hang.
Fix this by calling pm_runtime_resume_and_get() immediately after
pm_runtime_enable() to power the hardware up and enable its clocks.
Release the reference afterwards with pm_runtime_put() to allow the
runtime PM framework to suspend the device and switch the regmap to
cache-only mode when idle.
When CONFIG_PM is disabled or runtime PM is not enabled, pm_runtime_*
calls are stubs that do not power up the hardware. Handle this case
explicitly by calling fsl_audmix_runtime_resume() directly so the
hardware is always initialised and its clocks are enabled, ensuring
register accesses succeed regardless of PM configuration. |
| go-openapi/swag jsonutils before 0.27.1 contains a stack overflow vulnerability in ordered JSON parsing and serialization due to unbounded recursion with no depth limit. Remote unauthenticated attackers can submit deeply nested JSON documents to services accepting OpenAPI specifications, causing fatal stack overflow that terminates the process and all in-flight requests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: rk3288 - fail ahash requests on HASH idle timeout
rk_hash_run() waits for RK_CRYPTO_HASH_STS to become idle after the
final DMA transfer, but ignores the poll result. If the hash engine
never becomes idle, the driver still reads the digest registers and
finalizes the request with the previous success value.
Store the poll result and finalize the request with the timeout error
before reading the digest registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/mbox: Break poison list loop on an empty payload
A device that returns count == 0 with CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE set on every
iteration never advances nr_records, so the max_errors guard never
trips and the do/while loops forever while holding poison.mutex. That
hangs the sysfs-triggered scan thread and blocks all subsequent poison
operations on the device. The existing "Protect against an uncleared
_FLAG_MORE" guard was intended to bound a misbehaving device but does
not cover the count == 0 case.
Stop the loop on an empty payload so a malfunctioning or malicious
device cannot wedge the poison scan. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound TLV walk in mt7996_mcu_get_chip_config
The response TLV loop advanced by tlv->len without a minimum, so a
theoretical firmware response containing a zero-length TLV could spin
forever, hanging the CPU during device probe.
The u32 payload was also read without bounds checking.
Reject a short fixed field, stop on a TLV whose length underruns the
header or overruns the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/bitmap: resume array on backlog_store() error path
backlog_store() suspends the array before checking whether a write-mostly
device exists. If no such device exists, the error path only unlocks
reconfig_mutex and leaves the array suspended, blocking subsequent I/O.
Use mddev_unlock_and_resume() to release both states. |
| In the MISP sachertortephp library, the Xml::build() static method in lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php contains a logic error in the conditional that gates network-based XML fetching. The original condition was written as: $options['readFile'] && strpos($input, 'http://') === 0 || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0. Because PHP's && operator has higher precedence than ||, the expression is evaluated as ($options['readFile'] && strpos($input, 'http://') === 0) || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0. As a result, when a caller explicitly sets the readFile option to false to disable file and URL reading, an input string beginning with https:// still satisfies the condition and triggers a network fetch via HttpSocket (configured to follow up to 10 redirects). The http:// branch is correctly gated by the readFile flag, but the https:// branch is not. An attacker who can influence the $input parameter passed to Xml::build() can therefore force the application to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-controlled or internal URL, even though the caller intended to suppress all remote reads. The fetched response is parsed as XML and may be returned to the caller, enabling information disclosure from internal services or external targets. This constitutes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) weakness with an information-disclosure impact. The vulnerability requires that the code path in Xml::build() be reachable with attacker-controlled input and that the readFile option be set to false (or the caller expects it to be false). |
| google-protobuf contains an unbounded recursion when parsing unknown protobuf group fields. An attacker can send a small crafted payload of deeply nested START_GROUP wire bytes to any Node.js service that calls the generated deserializeBinary() API, causing a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded and crashing the process. No authentication or prior knowledge of the schema is required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: video-i2c: fix kthread error pointer left in kthread_vid_cap on failure
kthread_run() returns an ERR_PTR on failure, not NULL.
When start_streaming() fails, data->kthread_vid_cap is left holding
this error pointer instead of being cleared.
This causes two subsequent bugs:
1. A future call to start_streaming() sees a non-NULL kthread_vid_cap
and returns 0 (success) immediately, without actually starting the
capture thread.
2. A call to stop_streaming() checks 'kthread_vid_cap == NULL' which
is false for an error pointer, and proceeds to call kthread_stop()
on the error pointer, leading to a kernel crash.
Fix this by resetting kthread_vid_cap to NULL on failure before
jumping to the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: dat: avoid unaligned fault in IP extraction
Independent of the alignment of the ARP packet in the SKB, either the
batadv_arp_ip_src or the batadv_arp_ip_dst will have an unaligned access
(on HW without native unaligned read support).
Use get_unaligned() to handle this properly on all architectures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: pm8001: Use rollback index when freeing MSI-X vectors
pm8001_request_msix() unwinds previously registered handlers with
free_irq() when request_irq() fails. The rollback loop uses the failing
index i for every iteration instead of the already registered vector
index j.
That passes the wrong IRQ/dev_id pair to free_irq() and leaves the
earlier handlers installed. Use j for both pci_irq_vector() and the
matching irq_vector entry in the rollback loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix sleeping allocation in alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave()
syzbot reported a sleeping function called from invalid context splat in
bucket_table_alloc().
When rhashtable_insert_slow() rehashes the table under rcu_read_lock(), it
calls bucket_table_alloc(..., GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN). If the bucket
table allocation uses vmalloc, __vmalloc_node_range_noprof() invokes
vm_area_alloc_pages() -> alloc_pages_bulk_mempolicy_noprof() with the
passed GFP_ATOMIC flags.
If the current task has an MPOL_WEIGHTED_INTERLEAVE mempolicy,
alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave() is called and currently hardcodes
GFP_KERNEL when allocating the temporary weights array, triggering a
might_alloc() splat in atomic/RCU contexts.
Pass the gfp flags (masked with GFP_RECLAIM_MASK to strip page-allocator
zone modifiers like __GFP_HIGHMEM) received by
alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave() to kmalloc() instead of hardcoding
GFP_KERNEL. Since the weights buffer is immediately initialized in full,
kmalloc() is sufficient. |
| A specially crafted packet can cause the premature expiry of multicast forwarding state on affected interfaces, potentially resulting in temporary multicast traffic loss during the affected period. |
| docx4j is an open source Java library for creating, editing, and saving OpenXML packages, including DOCX, PPTX, and XLSX files. Prior to 11.5.14, PropertyResolver and adjacent helpers recursively follow the WordprocessingML w:basedOn style inheritance chain without cycle detection. A well-formed DOCX containing mutually based styles causes unbounded recursion in PropertyResolver.fillPPrStack and related effective-style resolution paths, resulting in StackOverflowError. Server-side conversion and table-of-contents processing of an untrusted document can terminate a worker thread, degrade a thread pool, or deny service, although isolation in disposable workers or safe containment of StackOverflowError can reduce the practical effect. The fix adds cyclic-style tracking and CyclicStylesException handling. This issue is fixed in version 11.5.14. |
| QDomDocument XML parsing is vulnerable to a remotely-triggerable denial-of-service crash when processing untrusted input. |
| vikunja versions before 2.6.0 contain a resource exhaustion vulnerability in the task-filter endpoint that accepts deeply nested filter expressions without recursion depth limits. Authenticated attackers can supply thousands of nested parentheses in the filter query parameter to exhaust memory and terminate the API process. |
| IBM Verify Identity Access could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to insufficient validation of incoming request resources. |
