Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Vendor Solution
The project is archived and currently no permanent solution is scheduled for release. See workaround section.
Vendor Workaround
Three independent fixes: * Set TEMP (or pass -Djava.io.tmpdir) to a directory the service account owns and that is not world-writable. * Harden the systemd unit with PrivateTmp=yes, so /tmp is namespaced per service. * At the code level, extract into a directory owned by the service account and refuse to reuse a pre-existing extraction root that the service does not own, instead of forceMkdir-ing into whatever is already there.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Fri, 06 Nov 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In all versions of PyTorch's TorchServe, a predictable extraction directory in /tmp lets a local user swap the model handler and run code as the TorchServe service account leading to local privilege escalation. | |
| Title | pytorch/serve: Local privilege escalation through insecure temporary path | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-379 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Subscriptions
No data.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Akrites
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-06T20:18:25.863Z
Reserved: 2026-11-06T17:53:03.966Z
Link: CVE-2026-123974
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-06T20:17:20.633
Modified: 2026-11-06T21:17:08.410
Link: CVE-2026-123974
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-06T21:45:10Z